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Abstract
We produced a data set from a survey of a population of convicts in probation. We
combined this new data set with an oﬃcial data set from the Brazilian government
to study labor market discrimination faced by ex-convicts. We were interested in
estimating two potential eﬀects of discrimination, statistical (stigma) and behavioral
(peer-group) eﬀects. Our econometric results suggest that stigmatization leads to a
39% reduction in the wage earned by ex-convicts relative to the wage earned by
non-convicts. They also suggest that the peer-group eﬀect accounts for a reduction
in the relative earnings of ex-convicts of 1.1% per year of study. In addition, we also
show that ex-convicts earn 3.1% less per year of experience than non-convicts.
Keywords: Stigma Eﬀect, Peer Eﬀect, Crime Rate, Returns to Schooling, Wage
Discrimination
JEL Classiﬁcation: C31, J71, K49
Resumo
Este estudo tem como objetivo estimar os efeitos da discrimina¸ c˜ ao estat´ ıstica (efeito
estigma) e comportamental (efeito grupo) no sal´ ario. Para isso combinamos dados
oriundos de duas fontes distintas: dados da CEPEMA sobre indiv´ ıduos cumprindo
pena em liberdade condicional com dados da PNAD. Os resultados mostraram que o
efeito estigma leva a uma redu¸ c˜ ao de 39% no sal´ ario para ex-presidi´ arios em rela¸ c˜ ao
` aqueles que n˜ ao cumprem pena. No que se refere ao efeito grupo, os ex-detentos
percebem um impacto negativo de 11% quando comparados com pessoas da PNAD.
Observou-se ainda que ex-detentos recebem 3.1% a menos por ano de experiˆ encia em
rela¸ c˜ ao aos n˜ ao detentos
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Palavras-Chave: Efeito Estigma, Efeito Grupo, Taxa de Criminalidade, Retornos ` a
Educa¸ c˜ ao, Discrimina¸ c˜ ao Salarial
Classiﬁca¸ c˜ ao JEL: C31, J71, K49
1. Introduction
Permanent and prolonged exposition always results in some degree of
contamination.
Spock (Star Trek)
Since Becker’s seminal work (1968), the literature on illegal behavior has
grown very large. Recent developments in this literature include incarceration
eﬀects, the political economy of crime and criminal organizations and the eﬀects
of social interaction and family inheritance on crime (Glaeser e Sacerdote 1999).
A common issue examined in this literature refers to the costs a potential
criminal incurs upon initiation in a criminal activity. It has been postulated
that potential criminals face the possibility of being stigmatized if they engage
in criminal activities and are later caught and incarcerated. The stigma eﬀects
may be felt in terms of lower income streams earned by ex-convicts relative
to non-convicts in the labor market. As illustrated by Imai e Krishna (2001),
stigmatization is a particular type of statistical discrimination. 1 According
to Glaeser e Sacerdote (1999), there is room in the literature for studies that
measure the costs associated with stigma.
It appears that, in addition to statistical discrimination, there is another
important type of negative externality to which ex-convicts are subject, which
may further hinder their future earnings in the job market. Incarcerated
individuals may acquire certain traits from their peers, perhaps as optimal
survival strategies, which may aﬀect their behavior and make them less
susceptible to comply with norms and regulations governing employment in
legal activities. To the extent that deviations from perfect compliance with
employment norms may reduce an employee’s productivity, the ex-incarcerated
may be less productive than their non-convict counterparts. Indeed, it seems
reasonable to postulate that the longer is the period of incarceration, the longer
will be the period of exposition of the incarcerated to actions that may later be
⋆ Submitted in November 2006, accepted in May 2007. The ﬁrst author would like to thank
CNPq of Brazil for ﬁnancial support. Both authors beneﬁt from the comments of three anonymous
referees.
E-mail address: sachsida@pos.ucb.br
1 According to Cain (1986) and Phelps (1972) statistical discrimination occurs because of an
informational problem. As the employer does not know all the characteristics of the worker, he
attributes to the employee the average characteristics belonging to the group to which the worker
belongs. Thus, group characteristics will be attributed to that individual even though he does not
possess them.
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manifested in terms of disruptive behavior in the job market. We shall refer to
this negative externality faced by the incarcerated as a “peer-group eﬀect”. 2
To be more precise about the results derived from this study it must be said
there are competing reasons why incarceration may aﬀect the human capital
variables in which individuals acquire certain trails from their peer is simply
one of them. The jail-time by itself diminishes the productivity because a long
inactivity depreciates the human capital. Then it must becomes clear that we
can not isolate the diﬀerent factors of why there might be negative eﬀects on
productivity from incarceration, but simply calling these competing reasons
peer-group eﬀects.
Controlling for the individuals’ human capital, there are thus two eﬀects
that may cause a diﬀerential in wages between the groups of ex-incarcerated
and non-convicts, stigma and peer-group eﬀects. In this paper, we estimate
the magnitudes of these two eﬀects contrasting two population samples, one
of ex-incarcerated and one of non-convicts. 3 The statistical discrimination is
estimated combining the information derived from these two samples. In order
to estimate the peer-group eﬀect we use the mincerian equation related to
returns on schooling to verify the behavior of the estimated coeﬃcients link
to human capital variables comparing the results derived both the samples of
ex-convicts and individuals from PNAD. The idea is that time of incarceration
aﬀects negatively the human capital due to the reason we have already exposed
in this section.
According to our results, the stigma eﬀect is responsible for a reduction
of 39% in the average wage of the ex-incarcerated population relative to the
average wage earned by the non-convict population. As for the peer eﬀect,
our estimates suggest that the ex-incarcerated population earns on average
1.1% less per year of schooling than their average non-convict counterpart. In
addition, the average ex-incarcerated individual earns 3.1% less per year of
experience than his average non-convict counterpart. These measures should
be understood as a kind of upper/lower bound for the eﬀects of incarceration
over wages. After all, the current state of art in the literature does not provide
an eﬀective way to disentangle the stigma and the peer-group eﬀect.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a brief literature
review on illegal behavior and returns to schooling. Section 3 describes our
dataset. Section 4 presents the methodology used to verify the occurrence
of stigma and peer-group eﬀects. Although we ﬁnd that the ex-incarcerated
population is on average less productive than the non-convict population, we
will not be able to attribute such an eﬀect solely to the peer-group eﬀect.
Diﬀerences in ability may also explain some of the diﬀerential in productivity.
2 The Brazilian Legal System has special incarceration regime for graduate. For graduates, the
Legal System allows them expend the time of incarceration in a private jail. In this case, the
prisoner live the most of time isolated from the others convicts. It can be considered one strategy
to mitigate the peer-eﬀect.
3 The ex-incarcerated population in this study comprises of individuals who were in probation.
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Section 5 then attempts to disentangle ability and peer-group eﬀects. Given
some plausible assumptions, we are able to capture the peer-group eﬀect.
Section 6 concludes this study.
2. Review of the Literature
The importance of education for the accumulation of human capital is related
to increasing the probability of success in the labor market on the part of
individuals or to improve the possibilities for economic growth on the part of
countries, is illustrated in several articles [Shultz (1972), Topel (1999) and Card
(2001)]. The literature on returns to schooling began with the works of Becker
(1975) and Mincer (1958, 1974). Since then, diﬀerent types of methodology have
been used to capture the returns from education [see, e.g., Griliches (1977),
Garen (1984), Lam e Schoeni (1993), Ashenfelter e Krueger (1994), Harmon e
Walker (1995), Heckman et alii (2000), Bratsberg e Terrell (2002)].
Scholars frequently mention that education is a typical example of a positive
externality. Besides the individual monetary gains produced by education, a
number of other societal beneﬁts are created. It is usually postulated that a
more educated population can be expected to feature lower infant mortality
rates, to lead to an increase in the educational level of the following generation
and to a reduction of child prostitution, among other positive societal eﬀects.
However, the theoretical relationship between education and crime is far from
obvious. As an individual educational level rises, so do his opportunities in the
legal labor market. But, concomitantly, as the educational level rises, the costs
associated with initiation and success in criminal activities fall (Fajnzylber
et alii 2000). Nevertheless, it is common to include educational level as an
explanatory variable in empirical studies of crime [see, e.g., Ehrlich (1975),
Fajnzylber et alii (2000) and Imrohoroglu et alii (2000)].
Becker (1968) provided the literature on illegal behavior with a formal
microeconomic model. The choice of an individual of whether or not to become
a criminal is viewed as a rational decision, whereby the individual evaluates the
beneﬁts and costs of criminal activities relative to their legal counterparts. Since
Becker’s contribution, several scholars have studied diﬀerent aspects of crime.
Some notable empirical works are Ehrlich (1973, 1975), Witte e Witt (2001) and
Lochner (2001). On the theory side, good examples are Davis (1988), Glaeser
et alii (1996) and Glaeser e Sacerdote (1999). As these studies have helped us
to better understand crime and its societal eﬀects, we are now better equipped
to elaborate public policies by which aim to reducing the occurrence of crime.
A recent branch of the literature focuses on the costs associated with criminal
activities. When we account for the life-cycle hypothesis, it seems reasonable
to postulate that ex-convicts face future punishments in the job market,
manifested in terms of lower than average salaries or increased hardship in
ﬁnding employment (Nagin e Waldfogel 1998). Using data on arrests from a
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national longitudinal survey on youth and delinquency, Joseph (2002) found
that an arrest record lowers annual earnings between 18 and 26 percent.
Lochner e Moretti (2004) using Census, FBI and NLSY data estimate that
by reducing crime in the population of high school graduates, society would
save between 14 and 26 percent of the average private return from education.
3. The Data Base
According to the Brazilian Legal System, lawbreakers are subject to three
types of punishment. First, the individual may be punished with a ﬁne. This
is very common in automobile traﬃc occurrences (excess of speed, parking in
forbidden places, etc.). Second, the individual may be required to help other
people or institutions by engaging in some community work. This type of
punishment is commonly applied to light criminal oﬀenses such as disrespecting
an oﬃcer and drinking and driving. Third, the individual may be incarcerated.
This type of punishment is applied to a broad range of oﬀenses, and the period
of incarceration is positively related to the severity of crime.
Conditional on good behavior, the incarcerated not convicted for certain
types of serious crimes, such as kidnapping, rape and drug dealing, have
some rights. If the period of incarceration is not greater than eight years,
the individual is entitled to a “semi-open” 4 incarceration regime after he
completes one third of his sentence. In this regime, the individual has the
right of working outside the prison during the day, being incarcerated only
at nights. Furthermore, after the individual serves two thirds of his sentence,
he has access to the “open regime”. In this regime, the individual may not
only work outside prison but also to spend the nights in his own home. An
ex-incarcerated individual in the open regime must appear in person and be
interviewed every other month by an oﬃcer in the Center of Coordination of the
Enactment of Alternative Measures (CEPEMA). This regime is thus similar to
the regime of probation observed in the United States.
According to CEPEMA, in 2003, there were around 2,000 individuals in the
open regime (“individuals on parole”) in the state of Distrito Federal. However,
we were not given any information about the type of crime committed by the
individuals on parole. During June and July 2003, we personally interview 503
male individuals on parole. 5 The interviews were authorized by the Court
of Justice of the Distrito Federal and Territories, and by the Tribunal of
Criminal Sentences. The data were collected when the individuals on parole
presented themselves to CEPEMA to be interviewed. The questions were
4 If the individual’s sentence is no longer than four years, he automatically enters in the open
regime. If the sentence is greater than four but less than eight years, the individual is placed in
the semi-open regime.
5 Following the literature on returns to schooling, we do not use data about females. The idea is
that females have additional considerations about fertility that generate some diﬃculties (Cameron
e Heckman 2001).
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elaborated following the methodology adopted by previous studies on returns
to education. 6
The sample used to represent non-convicts was obtained from annual data
supplied by the National Research of Home Samples of 1996 (PNAD/1996), 7
which is a national survey undertaken by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE). PNAD provides us with a representative sample of
Brazilian households. With the exception of National Census years, the survey
has been conducted since 1981. Each survey contains information, obtained
from face-to-face interviews conducted in the third week of September of
each year, on approximately 100,000 households. All members of a surveyed
household over ten years in age are asked detailed questions concerning their
labor market activities. Some of the questions asked in the survey enable us
to estimate a mincerian equation. The PNAD data set is of high quality. It
is the main dataset used by labor economists interested in the Brazilian labor
market.
Following the literature on returns to education, we use a small group of
explanatory variables. 8 Besides the endogenous variable, logarithm of wage
(lw), we include the following explanatory variables: educational level (s),
age, experience level 9 (exp), experience level squared (exp2), the mother’s
educational level (smother) and some dummy variables to account for whether
or not the worker belongs to a union (union), whether or not he works in
the formal sector (formal), and whether or not he is white (white). A dummy
variable was also created for individual on parole (prisoner) that takes a value
equal to one if the individual belongs to the sample of individuals on parole
and equal to zero otherwise.
Again, following the literature on returns to education, we used some sample
selections. First, we only considered men whose age proﬁle ranged between
24 and 56 years of age. It is claimed that for this group, considerations
about fertility, make their decisions concerning their level of education
less complicated (Cameron e Heckman 2001). 10 Second, we only included
non-students. 11 A third ﬁlter was used to exclude observations that do not
have one or more pieces of information regarding our independent variables.
This procedure appears in Heckman et alii (2000). 12 A fourth ﬁlter was used
to prevent including people who:
(i) possess extremely high wages, which could bias the results; and
6 In Appendix we present the questionnaire related to the questions.
7 1996 was the year chosen because this was when information concerning the education of the
individual’s mother is available.
8 Willis e Rosen (1979) and Garen (1984) use a very similar set of variables.
9 Experience=age−education−6.
10 Bratsberg e Terrell (2002), Heckman et alii (2000), Soares e Gonzaga (1997) and Garen (1984),
also restricted their sample to men only.
11 Bratsberg e Terrell (2002), Heckman et alii (2000) and Garen (1984) also used this procedure.
12 Garen (1984) estimates two regressions: the ﬁrst, using incomplete observations and the second,
using a sample that only considers the observations with all the information available.
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(ii) were not working.
This last ﬁltering implied that the sample was composed of individuals who
received an hourly wage between R$ 1.00 (approximately US$ 0.30) and R$
500.00 (approximately US$ 160). 13 A ﬁfth ﬁlter was used to exclude workers
employed in public administration and agriculture. This was done to prevent
sample contamination from the cyclical dynamics present in these sectors of
the Brazilian economy (Soares e Gonzaga 1997). Yet, a sixth ﬁlter was used to
restrict our sample to the inhabitants of the Distrito Federal in order to be in
accordance to the sample of individuals on parole. When we applied all these
ﬁlters, the original PNAD sample was reduced to a set of 987 observations. The
individual on parole’ sample was reduced to a total of 415 observations.
In Table 1, we provide preliminary information regarding descriptive
statistics for the variables used in this study. The data are grouped in three
diﬀerent ways. Column (1) gives us information about the individuals on parole.
Statistics for the non-convict population are available in column (2). In column




Variable Prisoners PNAD (Prisoners+PNAD)
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Mean Mean
Log of wage (Lw) 6.13 (0.74) 6.92 (0.96) 6.69 (0.97)
Years of schooling (s) 7.31 (2.81) 8.30 (4.68) 8.01 (4.24)
Age 29.26 (8.55) 36.23 (8.62) 34.44 (9.12)
Experience (Exp) 16.18 (9.16) 23.04 (9.64) 21.01 (10.00)
Union 0.19 (0.39) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44)
Formal 0.22 (0.41) 0.37 (0.48) 0.32 (0.46)
Years of schooling of 3.99 (3.47) 3.52 (3.10) 3.66 (3.22)
the mother (smother)
White 0.24 (0.42) 0.46 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)
Number of observations 415 987 1402
∗The values in parenthesis are the standard deviations of the variables
13 Heckman et alii (2000) restrict their sample to people who receive an hourly wage between U$
1.00 and U$ 100.00.
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4. Initial Econometric Results
The main objective of this section is to study whether or not stigma and
peer-group eﬀects substantially aﬀect an opener’s wage. To study the nature
of the discrimination faced by an opener in the job market, one should account
for both the fact that the individual was incarcerated and the period of
incarceration.
Ideally, one would use the following equation to estimate stigma and
peer-group eﬀects:
wi = lnWi = α + γPi + φTi + ϕhi + βSi + δXi + ǫi (1)
where P is a dummy for individual on parole, which attempts to capture
statistical discrimination (stigma eﬀect), T is the duration of incarceration
(peer-group eﬀect), W is the wage, h is the individual’s ability (or intelligence),
S is the individual’s educational level, X is a set of characteristics that can
inﬂuence the wage, we can also denominate X by control variables. The control
variables usually appear in the literature are related to race, union, formal
sector, etc. Finally ǫ represents the error term or disturbance. The expectation
would be that γ,φ < 0.
We have, however, to deviate from this ideal model because we do not
have information concerning either duration of incarceration and ability. The
information about jail-time is not accessible to the public and even the kind of
is also not accessible. The main objective of the open regime is to reintegrate
the individual to the society and the Brazilian Legal System considers that the
knowledge of this information is more one source of discrimination, mainly in
the labor market. We tried to obtain the time of incarceration directly from
the individuals on parole but even them were not sure or did not want to
answer about the jail-time correctly. One reason for that is related to the fact
that they also recognize it as something that generates discrimination. Since
we postulate that the longer the individual remains incarcerated, the longer
the contagion exposure and hence the greater the likelihood he will develop
behavior that hinders his productivity in the legal job market, it is therefore
unfortunate that we do not have data about duration of incarceration. We will
have to use some sophisticated econometric technique to attempt to capture
the peer-group eﬀect on the wage diﬀerential.
Based on the hypothesis that the distribution functions related to ability
is the same for the two groups, individuals on parole and PNAD. As our
premise is that an ex-incarcerated will on average be less productive than a
comparable non-convict worker because variables linked to human capital of
ex-convicts suﬀer from peer-eﬀect derived from the jail-time. We appear to
be in safe grounds when we claim that the noticeable eﬀect is equivalent to
the eﬀect produced by a situation where the average ex-incarcerated has a
lower ability than the average non-convict worker. The literature on returns
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to schooling, however, tells us that measuring an individual’s ability is rather
diﬃcult and tricky, since ability is highly correlated with years of schooling [see,
e.g., Griliches (1977), Willis e Rosen (1979), Garen (1984) and Card (2001)].
Hence, if we were to use OLS to estimate equation (1), we would obtain a
biased coeﬃcient for the variable years of schooling (s) because of the omitted
variables, ability (h) and the incarceration duration (T).
We must utilize some econometric techniques to solve the omitted variable
problem and subsequently estimate the magnitude of the peer-group eﬀect.
Our methodology for solving the omitted variable problem consists of two
steps. First, we estimate a mincerian equation by OLS. Second, we use three
stages least square (3SLS) as our econometric technique to solve the omitted
variable problem in the mincerian equation. Finally, we compare the returns
to schooling from both methods (βOLS and β3SLS). In order to verify the
existence of peer-group eﬀects we compare the estimated coeﬃcients of variables
linked to human capita, schooling and experience, between the convicts and
non-convicts. The diﬀerence between these parameters should give us an idea
of the magnitude of the combined ability and peer-group eﬀects. The question
we shall tackle in the next section is how to disentangle the peer-group eﬀect
from the ability eﬀect.
Table 2 reports the results for pooled data estimated using OLS and
3SLS. Following the literature about discrimination in the labor market, we
use a dummy variable to distinguish individuals on parole (prisoner) from
non-convicts. The idea is that the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable will capture
the existence of discrimination against prisoners in the labor market. As can be
veriﬁed, the coeﬃcient of the variable “prisoner” is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant in both estimations. This means that, after controlling for human
capital variables, the simple fact that the individual belongs to the group of
ex-incarcerated implies that he faces a wage punishment. As such punishment
does not depend on the individual’s human capital stock; it represents an
evidence of statistical discrimination or the magnitude of the stigma eﬀect.
Again, we must understand it just as an upper/lower bound of the eﬀect of
incarceration over wages. Remember that the state of art is not able to correctly
separate the stigma eﬀect from the peer-group eﬀect.
Table 2 also inform us that the diﬀerence between βOLS(0.146) and
β3SLS(0.167) is approximately 0.021, which implies in a diﬀerence in the returns
to schooling of 2.1% per year of education. This diﬀerence is huge. If we were
to suppose that 50% of this diﬀerence could be attributed to the peer-group
eﬀect, an average ex-incarcerated individual would earn 1% less per year of
study than an average non-convict counterpart. In the next section, we study
how much of the observed diﬀerence should be attributed to the peer-group
eﬀect.
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Table 2
Equation for the logarithm of the monthly wage


































∗The values in parenthesis are the t-test of the variables.
∗∗Endogenous Variables: Lw and S.
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5. Disentangling Ability and Peer-Group Eﬀects
This part of the article uses mincerian equation of wages to try to infer about
the magnitude of the peer eﬀect. Again, this section should be viewed just an
idea of upper/lower bonds of the eﬀect of incarceration over wages. For the
best of our knowledge the literature is not able to provide a good methodology
to separate the peer-group from the stigma eﬀect.
To illustrate our point, let the mincerian equation be represented by the
equation (2):
wi = lnWi = α + βSi + δXi + ui (2)
where W is a measure of income, or wage, S is a measurement of education
taking in number of years of study, X is a group of control variables that can
inﬂuence income, and u is the random disturbance that represent all the forces
which are not directly explicit in the model, but inﬂuence the individual’s gains.
Thus, the return to schooling is given by the parameter β, that represents
the marginal variation of the income in relation to education. Nevertheless,
Griliches (1977) points out, there are many speciﬁc points in (2) that should
be questioned. One of them is the existence of the so-called “ability bias”, that
occurs from not incorporating a variable, ˜ S, which can translate the ability,
or talent, of the individual (his intelligence, for example) due to measurement
diﬃculties. It is presumed that ability is correlated with the person’s education
[Griliches (1977) and Garen (1984)].
The employment of the three stages least squares (3SLS) method is an
alternative when it is presumed that a problem of measurement error exists,
as described above. This method can still be used when it is believed there is
a problem of an omitted variable, since this variable is correlated with the
disturbance [Green (1993)]. To verify the existence of peer eﬀect amongst
convicts, we will assume that the peer eﬀect is an omitted variable in the
equation (2). Besides this, we have that the individual’s ability (hi) is also an
omitted component of that equation. Thus, we have that:
wi = lnWi = α + βSi + δXi + λ1hi + λ2ei + ǫi (3)
In equation (3) the term representing the error of the equation (2) (ui) was
divided into two parts. The ﬁrst (ei) representing the peer eﬀect, and the
second (ǫi) that satisﬁes the classic hypotheses of the residue. So, (3) is the
true equation that we must estimate. However, given the absence of data for ei
and hi, we can only estimate the equation (2). To estimate (2) for the sample
of individuals composed by non-prisoners, we will have that the estimator β,
that represents the returns to education, will be biased only for the omission
of the variable ability. The estimate of this same equation for the sample of
prisoners will result in an estimator biased by the omission of both variables
ability and peer eﬀect.
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According to the above paragraph, the estimate of β for both groups will be
biased by the omission of the variable ability. But only the coeﬃcient β from
the prisoners’ sample will also be biased by the omission of the variable peer
eﬀect. Supposing that the ability bias aﬀects both groups in the same way,
we have that the diﬀerence among the estimators should give a notion of the
size of the peer eﬀect. That is, to detect the existence of the peer eﬀect, it is
necessary to show that the human capital variables generate a lesser return to
prisoners than to non-prisoners.
We will divide our sample in PNAD and Prisoners, and will estimate a
mincerian equation for each one. In the ﬁrst step we will use an OLS estimator.
Supposing that the ability bias aﬀect both samples in the same way, the
diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients of the human capital variables (s and exp)
is the magnitude of the peer eﬀect. In the second step, we will use a three stages
least squares (3SLS) approach. The idea of the use of this methodology is to
try to expurgate the ability bias. Again, the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients
of the human capital variable will be a proxy for the peer eﬀect.
Table 3 presents the estimated results for the equation of the logarithm of
wages. Firstly, concerning to the general results derived from the estimated
regressions they are in conforming to the literature on mincerian equation and
others studies associated to Brazilian labor market 14 [(Sachsida et alii 2004);
(Ueda e Hoﬀmann 2002)].
In order to verify the endogeneity of variable schooling associated to OLS
regression the Durbin-Wu-Hauman test is done using the estimated results of
equation (3) obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS) and an instrumental
variable (IV). The null hypothesis states that an (OLS) estimator of the same
equation would yield consistent estimates: that is, any endogeneity among the
regressors would not have deleterious eﬀects on OLS estimates. 15 A rejection
of the null indicates that endogenous regressors’ eﬀects on the estimates are
meaningful, and instrumental variable techniques are required. The results
appear on the right side of Table 6. Based on the results there is an indication,
mainly those derived from regression for prisoners, that the variable schooling
is not weakly exogenous in mincerian equation. According to the econometric
practice one can overcome the problem of endogeneity using the methods of
2SLS or 3SLS. Both these methodologies generate unbiased estimators but
3SLS is also an eﬃcient estimator. Then we perform the 3SLS in order to
estimate the mincerian equation free from ability bias.
Related to the main concern of this research four diﬀerent results are
presented. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated results by OLS from
14 To be honest one would expect to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient associated to variable formal,
the dummy for formal sector. Related to the negative coeﬃcient estimated for this variable, the
authors would like to pose based on the others studies and our experience that this fact reﬂects a
characteristic founded in the labor market of Distrito Federal and not a general characteristic of
Brazilian labor market.
15 Under the null, it is Chi-squared distributed with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number
of regressors speciﬁed as endogenous in the original IV regression.
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the samples of PNAD and Prisoners, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report
the same results, but using a 3SLS method. As can be noted, the diﬀerence
between columns (1) and (2) for the variable schooling (experience) is 0.014
(0.032). This means that a prisoner receives a return to schooling (experience)
1.4% (3.2%) lesser than a non-prisoner by year of study (experience). Using
the results reported in columns (3) and (4) we can verify that the returns to
schooling (experience) for a prisoner is 1.1% (3.1%) lesser than that received
by a non-prisoner per year of study (experience). According to the results
showed in Table 3, there seems to be a penalty in both the returns to education
and in the experience for the prisoners. According to the arguments presented
previously, this is an indication of the occurrence of the peer eﬀect. Thus, the
peer eﬀect for the prisoners can be seen as a reduction in the return of both
education and experience. 16
To be more precise about the results derived from Table 3 there are
competing reasons why incarceration may aﬀect the human capital variables.
The jail-time by itself diminishes the productivity because a long inactivity
depreciates the human capital. It must becomes clear that we can not isolate
the diﬀerent factors of why there might be negative eﬀects on productivity from
incarceration, but simply calling these reasons peer-group eﬀects.
16 Based on the information in Table 1, the mean of schooling for openers is about 7 years what is
below the mean time to take the graduate degree. Then in accordance to Note 2, it is more likely
that ex-convicts are contaminated by peer-group eﬀect.
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Table 3
Equation for the logarithm of the monthly wage
∗
Vari´ avel OLS 3SLS∗∗
PNAD Prisoner PNAD Prisoner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Lw
S 0.144 0.130 0.171 0.160
(25.86) (11.92) (6.69) (5.56)
Exp 0.055 0.023 0.055 0.024
(5.21) (2.20) (4.67) (2.13)
Exp2 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0003
(-3.68) (1.63) (-3.83) (1.57)
Formal -0.215 -0.123 -0.216 -0.113
(-4.75) (-1.69) (-3.76) (-1.56)
Union 0.222 0.427 0.233 0.423
(4.71) (5.40) (4.00) (4.96)
White 0.240 -0.033 0.162 -0.055
(5.38) (-0.51) (2.25) (-0.79)
Constant 4.817 4.623 4.628 4.392
(33.12) (31.49) (13.30) (15.38)
R2 0.530 0.425 0.513 0.412
DWH test 3.245 2.482
(0.072) (0.115)
Dependent variable: S
White - - 2.384 0.485
(8.63) (1.70)
Smother - - 0.421 0.368
(9.50) (10.46)
Constant - - 5.704 5.724
(24.69) (29.23)
R2 0.165 0.216
Observations 987 415 987 415
∗The values in parenthesis are the t-test of the variables.
∗∗Endogenous Variables: Lw and S.
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6. Final Comments
This is the ﬁrst trial in country-regionplaceBrazil to measure discrimination
for ex-convicts in labor market. This article built an unpublished dataset with
the authorization of the Court of Justice of Distrito Federal and Territories,
by means of direct interviews with convicts serving time outside prison. This
study sought to verify the occurrence of both the stigma and the peer eﬀects
for convicts. The basic idea was that the existence of these two eﬀects would
imply a wage penalty for individuals who had once served time in prison.
In relation to the peer eﬀect, the estimates from three stages least squares
(3SLS) suggest that individuals who were once prisoners receive a return 1.1%
lesser by year of education than the individuals who never served time in
prison. Also, the prisoners receive a return 3.1% lesser by year of experience
than individuals who never served time in prison. This fact seems to imply
an occurrence of the peer eﬀect. That is, the fact that an individual served
time in prison, and lived with other convicts, suggests that he acquired some
group characteristics, which decreased his productivity in the legal sector of the
economy. In relation to the stigma eﬀect, the 3SLS (OLS) estimation suggests
that the prisoners receive a wage penalty of 39.6% (33.4%) in their wages. As
mentioned before, since there is not an appropriate methodology to disentangle
the stigma and the peer-group eﬀect these measures should be understood as
upper/lower bounds of the impact of incarceration over wages.
In a general way this work tried to contribute to the literature concerning to
the costs of incurring in an illegal activity. The results suggest that besides the
traditional costs of being arrested (time spent in prison, not receiving wages
during that period, etc.), there are two additional cost associated to the prison
life, the peer eﬀect and the stigma eﬀect. The peer eﬀect implies that during
the time in the prison, the prisoner receives inﬂuences from other prisoners and
these inﬂuences will decrease his ability in the legal labor market. Furthermore,
the stigma eﬀect implies that the society will discriminate prisoners after they
go out to the legal labor market. The convicts will confront this cost when
they try to return to the legal labor market. The measurements of this type of
cost are important because they have a direct impact on the returns that legal
activity oﬀers to the former convict. As this study suggests, the costs associated
to both the peer and the stigma eﬀect are high, and could imply in the loss of
attractiveness of activities in the legal labor market for former convicts.
In order to be more precise about the results derived from this study it must
be said there are competing reasons why incarceration may aﬀect the human
capital variables in which individuals acquire certain trails from their peer is
simply one of them. The jail-time by itself diminishes the productivity because
a long inactivity depreciates the human capital.
A suggestion for future researches would be the analysis of the implications
of the results found in this article for the formulation of public policies. After
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all, a public policy that would decrease the peer eﬀects (or the stigma eﬀect)
would facilitate the prisoner’s permanence in the legal labor market of the
economy, and therefore help avoid the repetition of the same crimes. However,
the decrease of the costs associated to the peer eﬀects (or the stigma eﬀect)
implies that the cost of entering in the illegal activity would also be reduced.
In this way, it would be interesting to know what would be the net eﬀect, over
the criminal activity, of a decrease in the costs associated to the return of the
former convict to the legal labor market of the economy.
In fact, some suggestions for public policies can be obtained from this study.
One of them is related to the fact that incarceration has eﬀective negative eﬀect
on productive. If it derives from peer-group eﬀect or the depreciation of the
human capital is not important for practical reasons. The educative programs
can be used to mitigate the depreciation of human capital. Jointly to it the
allocation of the convicts in a prison must be done in order to separate the
individual according to the degree of his potential danger. This procedure can
mitigate the peer-group.
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Appendix
Questionaire





6) State which was born:
7) Do you have a job in the formal sector:
8) Are you unionized:
9) Do you have kids:
10) Years of Schooling of your mother:
11) Gender:
12) Monthly Wage:
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